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PLEAS’ PROGRESS
Stephanos Bibas*
PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA. By George Fisher. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
2003. Pp. xi, 397. $65.
George Fisher’s new book, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph,1 is really
three books in one. The first part is a careful, detailed explanation of
how and why plea bargaining exploded in Middlesex County,
Massachusetts in the nineteenth century. This part is the fruit of an
impressive amount of original research in Massachusetts court records
and newspaper archives. The second part of the book looks more
broadly at other academic histories of plea bargaining in England,
California, and New York. It explains how the forces that produced
plea bargaining in Middlesex County likewise contributed to plea
bargaining’s rise elsewhere. The final part applies the lessons of
history to critique current criminal procedure. In particular, Fisher
criticizes the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for tilting the balance of
power toward prosecutors.
Academics have already written a number of histories of plea
bargaining in Massachusetts and elsewhere, but this one is different.
Fisher, a former Middlesex County prosecutor and now a professor at
Stanford Law School, brings his prosecutorial perspective to bear in
explaining the rise of plea bargaining. I will review Fisher’s book from
this same perspective, as both of us are plea-bargaining scholars and
former prosecutors rather than professional historians.
My thesis is that Fisher adds an important dimension to the history
of plea bargaining precisely because he looks at it with a prosecutor’s
eye. Instead of resting on broader social explanations of plea
bargaining, which have become fashionable of late, Fisher emphasizes
the caseloads, incentives, and powers of judges and prosecutors. His
prosecutor’s eye sees the actors’ powers and incentives from a
rational-actor perspective that purely academic historians often miss.

* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
(bibas@philo.org). B.A. 1989, Columbia; B.A. 1991, M.A. 1998, Oxford; J.D. 1994, Yale. —
Ed. I am grateful to Tung Yin for his advice and comments on an earlier draft.
1. George Fisher is Professor of Law, Stanford University. The book is a substantially
expanded version of an article that Fisher published in the Yale Law Journal. See George
Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000).
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(Though the rational-actor approach looms large in theoretical and
normative scholarship about plea bargaining today, it is largely absent
from historical accounts.)
In particular, Fisher notes that most histories have focused on the
incentive and desire to bargain while assuming that prosecutors had
the power to do so. Fisher, however, notes that prosecutors started out
with the incentive but not the power to bargain, and judges started
with the power but not the incentive. Over the course of the
nineteenth century, prosecutors developed powers to bargain
unilaterally in some cases. Later, judges developed incentives to
cooperate with prosecutors and spread bargaining more broadly, to
offset their crushing civil dockets.
Unfortunately, in discussing prosecutors and judges, Fisher pays
much less attention to the role of defense counsel. Indeed, his sources
limit what he can say, as prosecutors drafted the indictments and
motions in the court files on which he relies. Nonetheless, a fuller
rational-actor account of plea bargaining must explore the roles of
defense counsel as well as prosecutors and judges. Defense counsel
develop bonds of trust with prosecutors and judges and establish going
rates or prices for particular crimes. In other words, defense counsel
serve as repeat players. Plea bargaining is possible without defense
counsel, but repeat players grease the wheels, influence defendants’
decisions to plead, and balance other actors’ powers.
Part I of this Review considers Fisher’s in-depth exploration of
Middlesex County courts in the nineteenth century. Fisher’s thorough
review of thousands of court records and newspaper archives explains
plea bargaining’s rise in two main stages: First, prosecutors used their
limited powers to bargain without the cooperation of judges. Fixed
penalties for liquor-law violations and murder gave prosecutors the
power to charge bargain unilaterally. Prosecutors later developed the
technique of placing cases on file (in suspension), which eventually
developed into modern probation. Second, judges, who previously had
resisted ceding their sentencing power to prosecutorial bargaining,
acceded to offset the mounting burden of their civil dockets. This
second step allowed bargaining to expand to embrace all kinds and
degrees of crime. Fisher is the first scholar to emphasize the growth in
civil dockets. His account of the forces at work in Massachusetts is far
superior to those of Theodore Ferdinand and especially Mary Vogel,
whose work Fisher demolishes.2
2. THEODORE FERDINAND, BOSTON’S LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS, 1814-1850 (1992);
Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of
State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161 (1999) [hereinafter Vogel, Social
Origins]; Mary E. Vogel, Courts of Trade: Social Conflict and the Emergence of Plea
Bargaining in Boston, Massachusetts, 1830-1890 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University) (on file with the University of Iowa College of Law Library)
[hereinafter Vogel, Courts of Trade].
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Part II considers how the lessons of Middlesex County explain the
rise of plea bargaining elsewhere. Fisher is perhaps too dismissive of
other scholars, such as John Langbein and Milton Heumann, whose
accounts of plea bargaining in many ways complement his own.3
Regardless, Fisher’s rational-actor account convincingly explains how
and why plea bargaining grew to dominate in New York, California,
and England, as well as Massachusetts. Here, as in his account of
Middlesex County, the only thing missing is a fuller appreciation of
the role of defense counsel.
Part III concludes with the lessons of the past for the present. In
recent years, the academic debate over plea bargaining has all too
often revolved around whether or not to abolish plea bargaining. But
as Fisher’s account shows, plea bargaining will not disappear any time
soon, especially because caseloads are so large. Even an unusually
large drop in caseloads or a few local efforts to ban bargains probably
would not kill plea bargaining. Judges, lawyers, and defendants have
come to like the swiftness and certainty of bargaining and would keep
liking it even if they had time to try every case. These insiders’
preferences carry much more weight than the public’s grave suspicion
of the process. This is true because the insiders have the power,
personal stakes, and better information about the low-visibility
bargaining process. Thus, bargaining is here to stay. Plea bargaining
has triumphed, in Fisher’s phrase, because it has endeared itself to the
actors with real power.
We cannot turn back the clock two centuries, and it is pointless to
keep writing articles that treat jury trials as the norm. More fruitful
and practical reform would give judges and defense counsel the power
to check prosecutors. Fisher’s critique of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines rightly emphasizes this point. Prosecutorial control over
charging and sentencing led to plea bargaining’s rise. Just so, plea
bargaining’s moderation depends on checking and balancing
prosecutors’ unilateral charging and sentencing power. The lessons of
the past contain the seeds of reform for the present.
I.

THE LESSONS OF MIDDLESEX COUNTY
A. Prosecutors’ Tricks of the Trade

Fisher’s tale is a minuet of prosecutors’ powers and judges’
incentives. His account begins with the appointment of the first
Middlesex County prosecutor in 1807 (p. 19). In early nineteenthcentury America, public prosecutors worked part-time for low pay, so

3. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978) [hereinafter Langbein, Torture].
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they had to maintain private practices on the side. As a result, they
had two obvious incentives to plea bargain: First, they sought to ease
their crushing workloads and to make more time for their paying
private clients (pp. 40-44). Second, they also liked quick, certain, easy
victories, which allowed them to boast about their high conviction
rates (pp. 48-49).
Though prosecutors’ incentives to plea bargain were clear, their
powers to plea bargain were not. Before pleading guilty, most
defendants demanded a quid pro quo — an express or at least implicit
promise of leniency in return. In most cases, prosecutors could not
assure defendants that judges would reward pleas with lower
sentences. Judges set sentences within broad sentencing ranges, and
prosecutors lacked the power to bind judges’ hands. So, without
judicial cooperation, prosecutors were powerless (pp. 24-25, 49-51). In
the early nineteenth century, judges did not share prosecutors’
incentives to plea bargain. As full-time, well-paid officials, they lacked
prosecutors’ incentives to save time for lucrative private practice.
Also, unlike prosecutors, judges did not see convictions as statistics in
their win-loss ratios. And, as a matter of principle and pride, they were
reluctant to surrender their sentencing power to prosecutorial
bargaining (pp. 52-58).
Prosecutors could bargain, therefore, only in two exceptional areas
where they could unilaterally control sentences. First, the
Massachusetts liquor laws carried fines that were fixed or spanned a
narrow range. Prosecutors could nolle prosequi (dismiss) counts of an
indictment unilaterally and set the costs defendants had to pay upon
conviction. Clever prosecutors would charge each violator with four
liquor-law counts and nolle three counts in exchange for a guilty plea
to the fourth. By dropping charges that carried heavy fixed penalties
and setting costs lower, prosecutors could guarantee lower sentences
for plea bargains and threaten heavier sentences after trial (pp. 21-30).
Second, prosecutors had similar power in murder cases, because
murder carried a mandatory death penalty. Prosecutors could nolle
the indictment’s allegation of malice aforethought and reduce the
charge to manslaughter, which was punishable by zero to twenty years’
imprisonment. Once again, determinate penalties made charge
bargaining possible and reliable (pp. 33-35).
Here Fisher’s prosecutorial eye sees what others have overlooked.
Theodore Ferdinand, for example, has noticed the concentration of
pleas and charge bargains in Massachusetts liquor-law cases.
Ferdinand theorized (1) that constables invented plea bargaining
while negotiating with criminals for information, (2) that tavernkeepers were savvy enough to seek bargains, and (3) that there were
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no victims to oppose bargains involving victimless crimes.4 Though his
speculation sounds plausible, it rests on no hard facts (pp. 58-61).
Fisher, in contrast, sees that the pattern of overcharging and nolles
resembles the way prosecutors overcharge and charge bargain today.5
He understands the link between fixed liquor-law penalties and the
prosecutor’s unilateral power to nolle. And so he sees why in 1852 the
legislature, to ban plea bargaining, required court approval to nolle in
liquor-law cases. Once prosecutors lost their power to nolle
unilaterally, charge bargaining in liquor cases ground to a halt (pp. 49,
51). Fisher’s prosecutorial insight sees the more elegant and
compelling explanation for these facts that broad-brush paintings of
social forces miss.
After the state legislature ended charge bargaining in liquor cases,
prosecutors used another bargaining trick. In liquor-law and other
less-serious cases, defendants pleaded guilty in return for having
prosecutors place their cases “on file.” Convicted defendants were not
sentenced until the prosecutor chose to move for sentencing. Placing a
case on file meant putting it in suspense and not moving for sentencing
unless the defendant later broke the law again. The on-file technique
is nothing more than an old form of probation (pp. 63-77). Here, as
elsewhere, Fisher is careful to point out the inferences and lacunae in
the evidence, but his story is nonetheless convincing. The broader
lesson he draws is that probation flourished because it furthered
prosecutors’, and later judges’, interests in plea bargaining. Plea
bargaining was so popular and powerful that legislative efforts to
stamp it out caused it to spring up in new procedural forms (pp.
89-90).
B.

Defense Counsel

If Fisher’s account is right, one would expect to see plea rates
increase steadily throughout the nineteenth century. The biggest
problem for his account is that guilty-plea rates look more like a “V”
than a steady upward line. They hovered around sixty percent at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, then dropped to around forty
percent for the middle third of the century, and climbed again to
eighty percent by the end of the century. Fisher’s explanation is that at
the beginning of the century, most defendants were likely
4. FERDINAND, supra note 2, at 13, 15, 66, 95, 186 (constabulary explanation); id. at 81
(defining Ferdinand’s category of “vice or regulatory” offenses to encompass liquor-law
violations); id. at 50 tbl.2.2, 59 tbl.2.3, 77, 79 tbl.3.6 (showing pattern of bargaining in these
cases).
5. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that due process permits
prosecutors to threaten and carry out threats to file higher charges if defendants refuse to
plead guilty; treating overcharging and forgoing charges as part of the “give-and-take” of
negotiation).
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unrepresented. Instead of trying to defend hopeless cases themselves,
they pleaded guilty without bargains and threw themselves on the
mercy of the court (pp. 93 tbl.4.1, 95-100). Thus, increasing rates of
representation helped to lower plea rates. Fisher forthrightly admits
the evidentiary hole in his argument: there is no solid evidence of
representation rates before 1844 (p. 96). The account is plausible but
invites more questions. One would think that prosecutors were more
tempted to buy off represented defendants with plea bargains. After
all, defense counsel made cases more time-consuming to try, were
more likely to win, and were shrewder about bargaining possibilities.
Fisher’s answer is that prosecutors lacked the power to bargain,
because they would not put serious cases on file and let defendants go
(p. 101).
The other question is why plea rates spiked upwards late in the
century. Fisher’s explanation is that Massachusetts granted defendants
the right to testify on their own behalf. This inadvertently hurt their
trial prospects: if they remained silent, jurors assumed they were
guilty. But if they took the stand, denied guilt, and were convicted,
judges penalized them more harshly for perjury. Pleas came to seem a
safer course (pp. 104-10). Once again, while Fisher’s account is
plausible, there is little solid evidence. The problem is that defendants
never explain why they are pleading guilty, and defense lawyers rarely
speak publicly about their clients’ motivations. Fisher’s account rests
on a few press reports, plausible but unproven. To his credit, Fisher is
candid about this limitation (p. 111).
Fisher’s account would be more satisfying if it devoted more
attention to defense counsel. Defense counsel improved their clients’
prospects at trial and increased the length of trial. They also increased
the likelihood that defendants would plead guilty in exchange for clear
concessions (pp. 98-100). Fisher suggests that represented defendants
saw that their chances were better and so were less likely to plead
guilty without bargains, out of desperation. Unfortunately, he does not
reflect upon the other ways in which counsel probably facilitated
bargains: Defense counsel doubtless served an informational role, just
as they do today. They must have developed a sense of the going rate
for particular crimes. They must have told clients what was a good
deal for a particular case and must have encouraged them to demand
appropriate concessions. And, as repeat players, defense counsel must
have built bonds of trust with prosecutors, making bargains more
reliable and so more desirable for both prosecutors and defendants.6
All of these factors probably facilitated plea bargaining, setting the

6. See HEUMANN, supra note 3, at 69-91 (describing how defense counsel learn the value
of the case, develop working relationships with prosecutors, and discover what discounts are
possible in various types of cases).
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stage for bargaining’s dramatic rise once judges saw benefits from
accepting pleas.
C.

Caseloads Caused Judges to Embrace Bargaining

Fisher’s account shows that plea bargaining could progress only so
far without the assent of judges. Without it, prosecutors could bargain
only where they controlled sentencing: liquor-law cases, murder cases,
and less-serious cases that they could put on file. The capstone of the
Middlesex County story is why judges abandoned their opposition to
plea bargaining and went along with prosecutors. The earliest scholars
of plea bargaining explained it as a response to rising caseloads, a way
for courts to lighten their dockets.7 More recently, Mary Vogel,
Theodore Ferdinand, and Milton Heumann have disputed “the myth
of caseload pressure” as a cause of plea bargaining.8
Fisher rehabilitates caseload pressure as the explanation for
judicial acquiescence in plea bargaining in several stages. First, Fisher
exposes flaws in these authors’ data correlating caseloads and pleas.
Fisher shows that the data are either unreliable or in fact support the
caseload-pressure hypothesis (pp. 9, 45-47, 294 n.31).
Second, Fisher shreds Vogel’s cultural and political explanation for
plea bargaining. Vogel claims that the newly enfranchised masses
chafed under the enforcement of social order. Political elites, she
claims, resolved the tension by bestowing “episodic leniency” on guilty
pleas, thereby maintaining order while pleasing voters.9 As Fisher
shows, however, the pattern of leniency was too small for the public to
notice (pp. 141-43). Contemporary newspapers and legislative reports
contained almost no mention of plea bargaining, and what little
attention it drew was unfavorable (pp. 144-51). Plea bargaining, in
short, was not well known and was unpopular when it was known.10 If
outsiders were not pressing for plea bargaining, the impetus must have
come from actors within the criminal justice system. This insight
underscores the value of a rational-actor analysis of the actors’
incentives.

7. Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927);
Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928).
8. Vogel, Courts of Trade, supra note 2, at 163-65; accord Milton Heumann, A Note on
Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (1975) [hereinafter Heumann,
Case Pressure]; see also FERDINAND, supra note 2, at 93 (“Whether plea bargaining was a
response to burgeoning caseloads . . . is debatable.”).
9. Vogel, Social Origins, supra note 2, at 165-66, 200, 232-33.
10. See also Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of ‘Public’ Prosecutors in
Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1336-37, 1385-86 (2002) (citing
nineteenth-century New York City press clippings to show that when the public did learn of
plea bargaining, it was outraged by the practice).

BIBAS PP4

May 2004]

9/24/2004 5:35:12 PM

Pleas’ Progress

1029

Finally, Fisher has the insight to look at judges’ overall workloads,
instead of just their criminal dockets. On the criminal side, cases per
judge peaked in the mid-nineteenth century and then declined while
pleas rose (pp. 116-17). Moreover, criminal trials did not grow much
longer until the end of the century, contrary to Langbein’s explanation
for plea bargaining’s rise.11 But judges’ civil dockets were exploding.
As the population grew and mechanization spread, people began to
suffer many more injuries on railroads and streetcars and in factories
and textile mills. Tort suits were more time-consuming than the old
civil-contract cases (pp. 121-24). Judges could do little to reduce their
civil caseloads, but they could offset them by disposing of their
criminal cases quickly. (This argument of course assumes that the
same judges had both civil and criminal dockets, which is often but not
universally true.) Judges controlled sentences, whereas juries
controlled liability and damages. Thus, as Fisher perceptively notes,
judges “had far greater power to coerce pleas on the criminal side than
to induce settlements on the civil side” (p. 123). Judges could promote
pleas by promising rewards, or by habitually following prosecutors’
sentence recommendations, or by letting defendants withdraw their
pleas if the sentence exceeded the recommended one (pp. 129-36).
Though in hindsight the role of civil cases seems to be common sense,
Fisher is the first to see it.
Fisher’s analysis is brilliant in its elegant simplicity. Until now,
scholars assumed that actors had the power to bargain, rather than
pointing to the precise sources of this power. Ordinarily, prosecutors
and judges must join forces to generate plea bargains. Before the civildocket crunch, prosecutors had the incentive but not the power to
bargain, whereas judges had the power but not the incentive.
Prosecutors found small pockets of power that they could exercise
unilaterally in liquor-law and murder cases and then in cases minor
enough for on-file treatment. But once civil-caseload pressure changed
judges’ incentives, they worked together with prosecutors to bargain
more broadly. Scholars need not invoke a complex, cumbersome
congeries of cultural and social forces to explain plea bargaining’s rise.
The courtroom actors all came to like it as a way to counteract
caseload pressure, and so it triumphed despite public ignorance and
legislative opposition.
II. THE MARCH OF BARGAINING ELSEWHERE
The Middlesex County tale is the core of Fisher’s book and
occupies about three-fifths of its text. Middlesex County is interesting
not only in its own right, but also because it casts light on the march of

11. Pp. 117-21; Langbein, Torture, supra note 3, at 3, 11.
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plea bargaining elsewhere. Fisher devotes a chapter to explaining how
the forces in Middlesex County produced plea bargaining in three
other jurisdictions: England, California, and New York. Some scholars
have criticized Fisher for building on one narrow case study instead of
starting with a broader statistical net, but this objection is unfair.12
Fisher’s strength is his focused depth in the first part of the book,
which lays a solid foundation for his breadth later on. Fisher makes a
powerful case that the forces he identified in Middlesex County
manifested themselves elsewhere as well.
Fisher begins with England and asks why plea bargaining was rare
if not absent in eighteenth-century England. John Langbein and
Malcolm Feeley have shown that there was no plea bargaining in the
Old Bailey (London’s main criminal court) in the eighteenth century.
They argued that the reason for the lack of bargaining was the brevity
of trials, which took hours or minutes instead of days.13 This
explanation is a variant of the caseload-pressure hypothesis. As trial
length grew, so did the total time demanded to try all cases. As judges
became busier, so the argument goes, they had to use pleas to lessen
their workloads.
Fisher agrees that there was little or no plea bargaining but points
to a powerful alternative explanation: the absence of public
prosecutors until the late nineteenth century. In England, victims had
to prosecute their own cases as private prosecutors because there were
no public prosecutors. As the Middlesex case study shows, public
prosecutors had the incentives to bargain and had some power,
especially the power to nolle. English crime victims lacked this power.
They did have some incentive to bargain to save time and money and
to avoid the risk of loss (pp. 155-56). (Fisher should have added the
obvious point that victims still had less incentive to bargain than public
prosecutors, who lacked personal stakes in seeing justice done.)
Victims did find a few ways to bargain, for example by not showing up
to testify in exchange for cash. Generally, however, private
prosecutors lacked the legal tools and expertise to bargain (pp. 15657). The lesson of Middlesex is that bargaining requires power and
12. Compare Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
101-02 (2002) (criticizing Fisher’s Yale Law Journal article, on which this book is based, for
not “collect[ing] as much data as feasible” and for trying to draw inferences about both
Middlesex County and America more broadly), with Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule,
Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160 (2002)
(dismissing Epstein & King’s criticism that Fisher should have engaged in “large-number
statistical empiricism” that would have resulted in “thin observations about many
jurisdictions,” because Fisher’s in-depth historical study enabled him to make valuable
“thick observations about one” jurisdiction).
13. Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal
Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REV. 183, 190, 199 fig.3, 202-05 (1997);
John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 261, 262-65 (1979) [hereinafter Langbein, Understanding].
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knowledge of the legal system. With neither the power to nolle nor the
expertise of repeat players, private prosecutors could not bargain.
Fisher also notes that Old Bailey judges had little incentive to bargain.
Their caseloads were growing very slowly, and the thorough press
coverage of the Old Bailey would have exposed any sentence
bargaining to uncomfortable scrutiny (pp. 157-58).
I would add that the absence of defense counsel was another
impediment to plea bargains.14 Though we often think of defense
counsel as adversaries who fight the prosecution at every turn, in fact
their role is much more cooperative and facilitates bargains. The
absence of defense counsel deprived defendants of repeat players who
knew the system, had developed trust with other actors, and knew the
value of cases. In addition, there were no defense counsel to combat
clients’ overconfidence, offering them sobering assessments of their
trial prospects and persuading them to plead guilty. Sometimes
defense counsel’s assessments are clear-eyed; at other times, they may
be jaundiced and self-serving, as lawyers seek to dispose of cases and
collect their fees quickly. Either way, defense counsels’ advice might
well have produced more plea bargains and fewer trials.
Fisher treats his explanation as a novel alternative to Feeley and
Langbein’s, but it would be fairer to understand it as a complement.
Though sometimes bargaining has risen without trials becoming
longer, at other times longer trials have correlated with rises in plea
bargaining. More procedural rights, longer trials, and increasing case
filings cause congested dockets and caseload pressure to plea bargain.
The more time-consuming each trial is and the more cases there are,
the more cases have to be disposed of by other means. Thus, as Fisher
acknowledges in his prologue, his caseload explanation supplements
Langbein’s but in truth does not supplant it (pp. 9-10).
Where English judges faced less press scrutiny, plea bargaining
took off. Fisher studied sentencing patterns for petty larceny in
Manchester in the late eighteenth century. He found that almost half
of defendants who stood trial suffered seven years’ transportation
abroad, which included a dangerous ocean voyage to Australia or
elsewhere. In contrast, every single defendant who pleaded guilty got
a short term of imprisonment instead of a dangerous exile (pp. 15859). Fisher’s main explanation is that Manchester’s petty larceny
caseload quadrupled within a generation (pp. 159-60).15 In addition, in
14. Langbein, Understanding, supra note 13, at 263. Although Langbein noted the
absence of prosecutors and defense counsel, he used this fact only to explain that trial
procedures were much simpler before lawyers complicated things.
15. This dramatic growth makes sense. Manchester was one of the new industrial cities
that burgeoned in the Industrial Revolution, which must have brought many more industrial
accidents and tort suits as well as crimes, whereas London had long been a large, bustling
city and was not growing as fast. See William Roberts, A Charge to the Grand Jury of the
Court Leet, for the Manor of Manchester, in 9 THE COURT LEET RECORDS OF THE MANOR
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1790 the magistrates’ new house of corrections opened, which at the
time was a novel penological effort to reform convicts. Reformminded magistrates may have offered this new opportunity to
defendants who were the most promising candidates for reform,
namely those who pleaded guilty and seemed contrite (pp. 159-60).
The burgeoning caseload of Manchester fits well with Fisher’s
rehabilitation of the caseload pressure explanation in Middlesex
County.
Fisher then crosses the Atlantic to consider two American
jurisdictions. First, he reviews Lawrence Friedman and Robert
Percival’s history of criminal justice in Alameda County, California,
between 1870 and 1910.16 During that time, guilty pleas grew more
slowly than in Middlesex County. Guilty pleas to the charges in the
original indictment increased from 12% to 32% of all pleas entered as
guilty pleas to lesser offenses decreased from 10% to 4%.17 There was
little charge bargaining, Fisher argues, because prosecutors had little
power to do so. In 1851, the California legislature took the power to
nolle away from prosecutors and gave the power to dismiss to judges.18
Just as this step killed liquor-law charge bargaining in Middlesex
County, so it greatly limited post-indictment charge bargaining in
Alameda County (pp. 161-62). Also, judges had less incentive to
bargain. There were many more judges and many fewer cases in
Alameda County, which meant much less caseload pressure (pp.
163-64).
Although Alameda County judges had little interest in plea
bargaining, the other actors did. Defense lawyers gained incentives to
bargain in 1872 when the California state legislature enacted
recidivism enhancements with stiff mandatory minimum sentences.19
Further legislation in 1880 created the preliminary examination, which

OF MANCHESTER app. I, at 243 (Manchester, Henry Blacklock & Co. 1889) (reporting that
Manchester’s population was growing so quickly that the criminal courts could not hear and
punish all crimes); ROBERT ROBSON, THE ATTORNEY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ENGLAND app. IV, at 166-67 (1959) (reporting that from 1790 to 1800 the number of
practicing attorneys in London grew from 1755 to 1800, whereas the number in Manchester
grew from 40 to 61). Compare David Cody, A Brief History of London, The Victorian Web,
at http://65.107.211.206/history/hist4.html (last visited July 14, 2003) (reporting that London’s
population increased from 300,000 in 1700 to 750,000 in 1760 to 900,000 in 1800), with
SPARTACUS
EDUC.,
Manchester,
at
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/
ITmanchester.htm (last modified July 25, 2002) (reporting that Manchester and neighboring
Salford grew from about 25,000 in 1772 to 95,000 in 1800).

16. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910 (1981).
17. Id. at 174 tbl.5.12 (tabulating all pleas of guilty or not guilty, and so excluding cases
that were continued indefinitely or dismissed before plea, for example).
18. Act of May 1, 1851, ch. 29, §§ 597, 598, 1851 Cal. Stat. 212, 279.
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666, 667 (Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1885); Ex parte
Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429, 430 (1873).
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allowed prosecutors and defense counsel to meet and review evidence
before prosecutors filed charges.20 But, as noted, judges still lacked the
incentive to go along. So prosecutors and defense counsel struck
charge bargains before the filing of formal charges. By doing so, they
averted the harsh mandatory sentences and circumvented judges’
power over dismissal of already-filed charges. This explains why pleas
to the offense charged rose dramatically as pleas to lesser offenses
plummeted (pp. 165-66). Once Fisher explains the point in terms of
the powers and incentives of the actors, it seems obvious in hindsight.
And yet the point eluded a legal historian as eminent as Lawrence
Friedman, who lacked a prosecutor’s eyes.
Finally, Fisher considers New York, relying on two studies, one by
Raymond Moley, the other by Michael McConville and Chester
Mirsky.21 Beginning around 1830, guilty pleas rose from almost zero to
more than three-quarters of all dispositions before the end of the
century.22 Seventy percent (or more) of guilty pleas in New York City
were to lesser offenses, which suggests a huge amount of charge
bargaining.23 The caseload of New York City’s major criminal court
quintupled between 1839 and 1865,24 which probably created great
caseload pressure to plea bargain (pp. 167-68).
Based on the example of Middlesex County, Fisher supposes that
prosecutors were the ones doing the charge bargaining to alleviate the
increased workloads. His question, then, is where they found the
power to do so. The 1829 criminal code, enacted just as guilty pleas
began to rise, divided crimes into multiple degrees. For example, firstdegree burglary was punishable by a minimum of ten years’
imprisonment, second-degree burglary by five to ten years, and thirddegree burglary by zero to five years.25 Prosecutors could charge first-,
second-, and third-degree burglary in the same indictment and then
nolle the higher-degree counts as part of a charge bargain.26 The code
contained many minimum sentences for degrees of burglary, robbery,

20. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 16, at 43-44.
21. Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York, 1800-1865,
22 J.L. & SOC’Y 443 (1995); Moley, supra note 7.
22. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 466 fig.3; Moley, supra note 7, at 108.
23. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 466 (reporting 70% in an 1865 sample);
Moley, supra note 7, at 111 (reporting 85% in 1926, though rates were much lower outside of
New York City).
24. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 463.
25. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3, § 21 (1829).
26. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 2, tit. 4, § 51 (1829); People v. Porter, 4 Park. 524, 526
(N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1860). Although some statutory language required court approval
for nolles, prosecutors appear to have continued to nolle individual counts freely, either
because the nolle restriction was not read to limit nolles of individual counts or because
judges, used to the prior nolle practice, routinely assented. Pp. 171-74.
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forgery, manslaughter, and arson.27 These mandatory minima allowed
prosecutors to tie judges’ hands and to credibly threaten higher
sentences after trial, which induced defendants to plead guilty.
Defendants could also plead guilty to attempts instead of completed
crimes, which lowered their sentencing ranges.28 Thus, in McConville
and Mirsky’s 1865 sample of guilty pleas to lesser offenses, forty-seven
percent were reductions from completed crimes to attempt.29 Finally,
the 1829 New York Code enacted stiff minimum sentences for repeat
offenders, which prosecutors may have been able to bargain away.30
Fisher’s analysis of statutory power explains why plea bargaining in
New York took the form of charge bargaining and why it started its
rise earlier than elsewhere, around 1830. Once the law gave
prosecutors the tools to bargain, they used them as broadly as the law
allowed, just as they did in Middlesex County.
III. LESSONS OF THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT
In his last two chapters, Fisher draws together the strands of his
history to understand the principles underlying plea bargaining. As
earlier in the book, his focus is on the courtroom actors and their
powers and incentives to bargain. He begins by looking at how plea
bargaining serves courtroom actors. Bargaining is efficient, assures
victory, and guards against reversal (especially once appellate review
expanded in the nineteenth century). So far, all of what Fisher says is
consistent with what Milton Heumann and others have long pointed
out.31 There is only one flaw: Fisher’s discussion of prosecutors’ and
judges’ incentives is once again marred by his omission of defense
counsel’s incentives from the picture. (As we shall see, however, he
does touch on the issue somewhat later.)
Next, Fisher turns to how plea bargaining serves the criminaljustice system. By delivering verdicts that appear truthful in clear
cases, it keeps juries from getting easy cases wrong. When a jury gets
the Rodney King or O.J. Simpson case wrong, the public loses faith in
the system as a whole. But these cases are anomalies that would
ordinarily result in plea bargains. By skimming off almost all easy
cases, plea bargaining leaves only hard ones for trial. And when only
hard cases go into the black box, there are no clear cases left for juries
to get wrong. The result is more faith in the system. In short, plea

27. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 1; id. at pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3, §§ 9, 20, 21, 57 (1829).
28. See, e.g., 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3, § 21; id. at pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 7, §§ 3(2), 27
(1829) (implying that attempts were lesser-included offenses of completed crimes).
29. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 21, at 466-67.
30. Pp. 169-71; 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 7, §§ 8(1), 9(2) (1829).
31. Pp. 175-77; see, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 3, at 110-14, 144.
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bargaining protects the public perception of legitimacy and justice, by
averting blatantly wrong outcomes.32 The irony is that plea bargaining,
having swallowed up most trials, now protects the jury ideal and the
few actual trials that remain.
Plea bargaining has proven to be so powerful that it fostered
procedures that are compatible with it and stunted those that could
stand in its way. Fisher’s previous discussion of how on-file plea
bargaining led to probation’s rise in Middlesex County is an example
of a symbiosis of these two procedures. In contrast, he argues that plea
bargaining thwarted the growth of truly indeterminate sentences,
which were premised on individualized assessments of rehabilitation
while in prison. Because true indeterminate sentencing would have
left all sentencing to the discretion of prison and parole authorities, it
would have made the benefits of guilty pleas speculative and thus
undesirable. To avert this problem, judges rarely exercised their
option to impose indeterminate sentences when they had a choice.
Parole boards granted near-automatic parole after the minimum term,
and they were more likely to parole defendants who had pleaded
guilty. Finally, judges sentenced defendants to narrow ranges (say,
eight to nine years instead of five to fifteen), leaving much less
discretion to parole boards. In short, defendants who pleaded guilty
could effectively predict their sentences, because judges and parole
boards behaved in predictable ways. The effect was to stunt the ideal
of indeterminacy as the price for plea bargaining (pp. 181-93). I have
only one quibble: Fisher personifies plea bargaining and often speaks
of how it swept away all obstacles in its path, as if it had life and power
of its own. This anthropomorphic locution is not only jarring, but also
obscures the human actors who had the incentives and found the
powers to make it happen. Nonetheless, his account is a compelling
tale of how the actors who benefited from plea bargaining could
sabotage reforms that got in their way.
Fisher also does a nice job of showing how the growth of public
defenders complemented plea bargaining. Some of the early advocates
of public-defender systems argued that public defenders would work
not only to acquit the innocent, but also to convict the guilty!
Encouraging guilty pleas, they argued, was both more efficient and
better for rehabilitation because confession is the first step toward
reform (pp. 194-96). Perhaps these statements were sincere, or
perhaps they were merely for public consumption. Either way,
advocates knew they had to sell the system to the powers that be as an

32. Pp. 178-80; cf. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1361, 1386-88, 1407 (2003) (arguing that Alford pleas, which are guilty pleas by those whom
the public perceives may be innocent, undercut public faith in and the legitimacy of the
criminal-justice system).
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adjunct to plea bargaining (pp. 196-97). Thus, it is no surprise that
public defenders had the highest guilty-plea rates: seventy percent, as
compared to sixty-two percent for appointed private counsel and
forty-nine percent for privately paid lawyers. Fisher correctly chalks
these plea rates up to caseload pressure and the desire to keep good
working relations with judges and prosecutors (pp. 198-200).
Closely related to Fisher’s points are some other incentives that
public defenders have to plea bargain. As repeat players, public
defenders have more plea-bargaining expertise, which should make
bargains better, more trustworthy, and more predictable for
defendants. And the guilty-plea rates cited above suggest that fee
structures may have affected bargains. Public defenders, often
overworked and paid a flat salary, have the strongest incentives to
plea bargain. Court-appointed private counsel typically receive hourly
fees subject to a low cap, which makes trials unprofitable. In contrast,
private lawyers who are paid by the hour earn more if they go to trial
and so have less pressure to bargain. Though Fisher does not express
these observations, all of these points complement his account.
By focusing on powers and efficiency, Fisher brings a fresh
perspective to the debate over the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
revolution. Liberals typically praise Miranda and other rights as
ensuring fair trials, while conservatives fear that they let the guilty
walk free on technicalities. Both criticisms, however, ignore the impact
of plea bargaining. Because the new rights made trials even more
cumbersome (echoing Langbein’s point), they increased the efficiency
gains from plea bargaining. And by giving the parties yet another
dimension along which to bargain, the rights created more
opportunities to bargain. The upshot was not fairer trials or scot-free
criminals, but discounted sentences in exchange for waivers of these
rights (pp. 202-03). New procedural rights, ironically, meant fewer
trials and less process.
Fisher’s final chapter looks at the balance of power between judges
and prosecutors. First, he notes that the advent of bench trials in the
twentieth century may have checked prosecutors. The early pleabargaining theorist Raymond Moley thought that judges would check
plea bargaining if they could.33 Fisher sees, however, that judges have
come to like bargaining’s efficiency and would use the power of bench
trials to strike more bargains. Ordinarily, prosecutors have great pleabargaining power because they can charge offenses that carry
mandatory minimum sentences and then bargain them away. But in
those states that allow defendants to choose bench trials without
prosecutorial approval, judges can subvert prosecutorial overcharging.
The judge can advise the defendant to choose a bench trial, at which

33. Moley, supra note 7, at 127.
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the judge will acquit of the highest charge to reduce the sentence. This
counterweight restores some check on prosecutorial power. The result
is that judges moderate sentences, resulting in more plea bargains at
more lenient levels (pp. 205-09). As far as I know, Fisher is the first to
make this point. He draws on his personal experience as a prosecutor,
and his point accords with my own experience as well.34
Conversely, if prosecutors can veto bench trials and charge many
crimes with mandatory minima, they can thwart judicial leniency.
Today, many states give prosecutors this veto, and many statutes
contain mandatory minima. As Fisher perceptively notes, rigid
sentencing guidelines are the functional equivalent of mandatory
minima, as they tie judges’ hands and their ability to check prosecutors
(p. 210).
Fisher critiques the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for further skewing
the balance of plea-bargaining power. The Guidelines have arguably
succeeded in their stated goal of cabining judicial discretion. They
have not, however, counteracted prosecutors’ substantial charging
discretion. The Guidelines try to offset prosecutorial discretion by
considering the defendant’s actual conduct and not just the offense
charged. Prosecutors can trump the Guidelines, however, by charging
offenses with low statutory maxima or high statutory minima. The
result is a substantial imbalance of power in favor of prosecutors (pp.
210-13).
The Sentencing Commission thought that prosecutorial leniency
was a source of sentencing disparity and that the solution was judicial
power to increase sentences. Thus, the Guidelines empower judges to
reject overly lenient plea bargains and to include uncharged conduct
in sentences. Most judges, however, like plea bargains and dislike the
newly increased penalties. So, few judges reject bargains or demand
harsher terms at the risk of triggering a trial. The bigger problem is
not checking prosecutorial leniency but checking prosecutorial
harshness. Prosecutors can overcharge to gain leverage for harsh
sentences, and judges have little power to check prosecutorial
harshness. If judges try to cut sweet deals unilaterally, say by departing
from the Guidelines, they face appellate reversal (pp. 212-21).
In theory, the Guidelines are merely guidelines and leave judges
flexibility to depart upward or downward in atypical cases.35 Indeed,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed district courts’ discretion to do so in
Koon v. United States.36 Nonetheless, appellate courts have read Koon

34. See also Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1155-59 & 1155 n.346 (2001) (citing Fisher, supra
note 1, at 1072).
35. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A.4(b) (2002).
36. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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narrowly, district courts remain afraid of reversal if they depart, and
Congress has recently abrogated Koon by legislation.37 Thus, fewer
than one percent of cases receive upward departures, and no more
than about seven percent of cases receive downward departures over a
prosecutor’s objection (pp. 217-18). Appellate review deters deviation
from the sentencing range set by the prosecutor’s charges and the
parties’ factual stipulations. The result is an imbalance of bargaining
power.
The Guidelines have had the unintended consequence of driving
up plea bargaining and reducing the number of trials still further. By
making sentences more predictable, they have reduced uncertainty
and the corresponding chance that defendants will go to trial out of
optimistic hope for judicial leniency (pp. 223, 225). And with their
intricate calculations, they create many more dimensions along which
parties can strike deals. The parties can now bargain over charges, the
true facts, the applicability of sentencing factors, and cooperation with
law enforcement (pp. 227-29). Far from thwarting plea bargaining, the
Guidelines have simply channeled it into new avenues.
The broader lesson here is that plea bargaining is a force that is
here to stay. Legislatures have tried to stamp it out, academics have
argued against it, and theorists have proposed elaborate alternatives
to it. To give two examples, the Guidelines’ real-offense sentencing
system was supposed to peg sentences to defendants’ actual conduct
and thus eliminate bargaining over what crimes to charge. And the
fixed reduction for acceptance of responsibility was supposed to
replace negotiable, bargained discounts for pleas.38 But today, no set
of rules can abolish bargaining or put the genie back in the bottle. The
font of bargaining, as Fisher’s history shows, is the desire for efficiency
and the power to manipulate charges and sentences. Prosecutors,
judges, and defense counsel have long since become addicted to the
efficiency of bargaining. Perhaps in isolated places a powerful figure
can stand against the tide for a time, by appealing to the public’s
understandable distrust of bargaining.39 Over time, however, the desire
for speedy, certain, efficient convictions causes even these isolated

37. See Douglas A. Berman, A Year in the Life of the Guidelines: The Supreme Court
Speaks, the Commission is Quiet, and Federal Sentencing Continues Largely Unchanged, 9
FED. SENTENCING REP. 280, 280-81 (1997) (noting that Koon had little noticeable effect on
departure rates). Recent legislation abrogated Koon, substituting de novo appellate review
of decisions to depart. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 § 401(d) (2003). This legislation
does, however, retain deferential review of the extent of departures that are otherwise
justified. Id.
38. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2002).
39. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (2002) (describing New Orleans’ restrictions on plea bargaining).

BIBAS PP4

May 2004]

9/24/2004 5:35:12 PM

Pleas’ Progress

1039

bargaining bans to crumble.40 What matters ultimately is not the
public’s suspicions, but the courtroom actors’ powers. As overlapping
statutes and mandatory minima have spawned more charge
bargaining, and sentencing laws have grown more complex, the actors
have gained more dimensions along which to bargain. The Guidelines,
which were supposed to shackle prosecutors, have instead become
their tool.
If plea bargaining has triumphed, it is pointless to write yet more
articles lamenting the demise of the jury trial. The better solution is to
view the problem in Fisher’s terms, as a balance of power. Efforts to
destroy prosecutors’ powers by drafting paper rules, such as the
Guidelines, have failed. The more promising possibility is to create a
balance of power, by giving other actors more power to check line
prosecutors.
For example, mandatory minimum sentences are not truly
mandatory, because prosecutors can usually choose not to charge
them. Thus, mandatory minima skew the balance of power by binding
judges but not prosecutors. Some states have experimented with
forbidding prosecutorial bargaining over certain crimes.41 Prosecutors
may, however, circumvent these laws by bargaining before
indictment.42 The way to check prosecutorial abuse of mandatory
minima is not by enacting paper restrictions on bargaining, but rather
by creating a genuine balance. To balance this power, legislatures
should restrict mandatory minima or allow judges to go below them in
more situations. In an ideal world, legislatures would also simplify
their criminal codes, to reduce overlapping statutes and to lessen the
opportunities for charge bargaining. (If complex laws such as the
Guidelines are giving prosecutors more tools, simplified laws would
take some of these tools away.) Legislatures could also make recidivist
enhancements turn not on prosecutorial charging decisions, but on
whether the enhancement applies on the facts.43 These reforms,
however, are unlikely to occur. Legislatures like giving more
bargaining chips to prosecutors, so that legislatures both look tough on
crime and dispose of more cases via pleas.
If legislatures will not lead reform, perhaps head prosecutors will.
If line prosecutors have the power to overcharge and penalize

40. See Teresa White Carns & John A. Kruse, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining
Reevaluated, 75 JUDICATURE 310, 317 (1992) (noting that the bargaining ban lasted for
about ten years).
41. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2004).
42. See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA 89-128 (1993) (noting that prosecutors evaded bargaining restrictions by
bargaining at earlier stages, before the preliminary examination or much discovery).
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2000) (giving prosecutors the power to file recidivist
enhancements, also known as prior felony informations).
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disfavored clients or lawyers, we may want to limit charging. There are
various ways to do this. For instance, a separate charging unit within a
district attorney’s office would have less incentive to overcharge than
an assistant who is trying to hoard plea-bargaining chips.44 More
supervision of line prosecutors’ charging and nolle decisions by higherranking prosecutors would restrict their freedom to overcharge and
bargain away. For example, the Reagan and first Bush Justice
Departments adopted policies that restricted line prosecutors’ charge
bargaining. Prosecutors had to file the most serious readily provable
charges, had to refrain from bargaining them away, had to put plea
bargains in writing, and had to get supervisory approval for bargains.45
The effect was to ensure more consistency, counteracting line
prosecutors’ incentives to bargain to ease their own workloads. In the
same vein, Attorney General John Ashcroft has recently forbidden
federal prosecutors to conceal or misrepresent sentencing facts or
acquiesce in illegal departures.46
There are other ways to adjust prosecutors’ incentives to bargain.
Because most head prosecutors are elected, greater transparency and
publicity of large charge reductions could deter overcharging in the
first place. A few may even successfully campaign on a platform of
restricting bargaining, as the New Orleans district attorney did for a
time.47 (The difficulty is explaining to the public why prosecutors are
declining to prosecute many marginal cases rather than bargain them
away.) The point is that restrictions on bargaining will come not from
paper bargaining bans, but from creating counterweights and contrary
incentives.
Finally, one might reform the presentence report process, giving
probation officers a larger role. If prosecutorial manipulation of the
facts skews judges’ sentencing decisions, probation officers may need
44. Cf. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1714-18 (2000) (advocating separation of
prosecutors’ quasi-adjudicative functions in setting charges and plea bargains from the job of
trying those cases that do not plead out).
45. See RICHARD THORNBURGH, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PLEA
POLICY FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1989) (“Thornburgh Bluesheet”), reprinted in 6 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 347 (1994); WILLIAM F. WELD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE PROSECUTORS’ HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1987) (“The
Redbook”), excerpted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 333 (1994); George J. Terwiliger III,
Acting Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum on Indictment and Plea Procedures Under
Guideline Sentencing, Feb. 7, 1992, reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 350 (1994);
Stephen S. Trott, Associate Attorney General, Memorandum on Interim Sentencing
Advocacy and Case Settlement Policy Under New Sentencing Guidelines, Nov. 3, 1987,
reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 342 (1994).
46. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Memorandum on Department Policies and
Procedures Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and Sentencing Appeals (July 28,
2003)
at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03_32/$FILE/
AG_Guidance_Stcg_Recs.pdf.
47. See Wright & Miller, supra note 39.
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more independent investigative resources to ferret out what actually
happened. This focus on powers, resources, and incentives is much
more realistic than simply announcing a ban and pretending that
prosecutors will not circumvent it.
Fisher’s thoughtful history, in short, is much more than history.
The past is prologue, and the present follows the same rules of power
and incentive that Middlesex County did two centuries ago. Thus, his
account sparks fruitful reflection on how to reform the system we have
today. Fisher’s prosecutorial eye adds a welcome dimension to the
historical literature, correcting the recent emphasis on broader social
forces. The key is to implement these lessons by creating concrete
checks and balances.

